Attack Trees for Security and Privacy in Social Virtual Reality Learning
  Environments by Valluripally, Samaikya et al.
Attack Trees for Security and Privacy in Social
Virtual Reality Learning Environments
Samaikya Valluripally, Aniket Gulhane, Reshmi Mitra*, Khaza Anuarul Hoque, Prasad Calyam
University of Missouri-Columbia, *Webster University
{svbqb, arggm8}@mail.missouri.edu, {calyamp, hoquek}@missouri.edu, reshmimitra25@webster.edu
Abstract—Social Virtual Reality Learning Environment
(VRLE) is a novel edge computing platform for collaboration
amongst distributed users. Given that VRLEs are used for critical
applications (e.g., special education, public safety training), it is
important to ensure security and privacy issues. In this paper,
we present a novel framework to obtain quantitative assessments
of threats and vulnerabilities for VRLEs. Based on the use
cases from an actual social VRLE viz., vSocial, we first model
the security and privacy using the attack trees. Subsequently,
these attack trees are converted into stochastic timed automata
representations that allow for rigorous statistical model checking.
Such an analysis helps us adopt pertinent design principles
such as hardening, diversity and principle of least privilege to
enhance the resilience of social VRLEs. Through experiments
in a vSocial case study, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our
attack tree modeling with a reduction of 26% in probability of
loss of integrity (security) and 80% in privacy leakage (privacy)
in before and after scenarios pertaining to the adoption of the
design principles.
Index Terms—Virtual reality, Special education, Security, Pri-
vacy, Attack trees, Formal verification
I. INTRODUCTION
Social Virtual Reality (VR) is a new paradigm of collabo-
ration systems that uses edge computing for novel application
areas involving virtual reality learning environments (VRLE)
for special education, surgical training, and flight simulators.
Typical VR system applications comprise of interactions that
require coordination of diverse user actions from multiple
Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices, processing activity data and
projecting visualization to achieve cooperative tasks. However,
this flexibility necessitates seamless interactions with IoT
devices, geographically distributed users outside the system’s
safe boundary, which poses serious threats to security and
privacy [1].
Although existing works [2]–[4] highlight the importance
of security and privacy issues in VR applications, there are a
limited systematic efforts in evaluating the effect of various
threat scenarios on such edge computing based collaborative
systems with IoT devices. Specifically, VRLE applications are
highly susceptible to Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attacks, due to the distributed IoT devices (i.e.,VR headsets)
connecting to virtual classrooms through custom controlled
This material is based upon work supported by the National Science
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Fig. 1: vSocial system components used for real-time student learning
session management.
collaboration settings. Moreover, loss of confidential informa-
tion is possible as VRLEs track student engagement and other
realtime session metadata.
In this paper, we consider a VRLE application designed
for youth with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) as case study
viz., vSocial [5]1. Our multi-modal VRLE system as shown
in Figure 1 uses the High Fidelity platform [6], and renders
3D visualizations based on the dynamic human computer
interactions with an edge cloud i.e., vSocial Cloud Server.
VRLE setup includes: VR headset devices (HTC Vive), hand-
held controllers, and base stations for accurate localization
and tracking of controllers [5]. Any disruption caused by an
attacker with malicious intent on the instructor’s VR content
or administrator privileges will impact user activities and
even cause cybersickness. Failure to address these security
and privacy issues may result in alteration of instructional
content, compromise of learning outcomes, access privileges
leading to confidential student information disclosure and/or
poor student engagement in ongoing classroom sessions. Mo-
tivated by the importance of ensuring security and privacy
in a VRLE application, we propose a novel framework for
quantitative evaluation of security and privacy metrics inspired
by the approach discussed in [7]. Our proposed framework
has benefits for identifying potential security and privacy
attacks caused by vulnerabilities in a VRLE application in
a manner that is not possible with traditional analysis [8]. We
model the potential security and privacy threats using attack
tree formalism and then convert them into their equivalent
1Moving forward we use the acronym VRLE to sometimes interchangeably
refer to our case study application viz., vSocial.
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stochastic timed automata (STA) representations [10]. The
STAs are then analyzed using the statistical model checking
technique (SMC) [9]. The SMC technique is widely used
owing to its capability of modeling and analyzing complex
stochastic and dynamic system behaviors [11], and thus can be
used to formally verify the VRLE system and user behaviors.
We use the attack trees concept from [12] and derive graph-
ical models that provide a systematic representation of various
attack scenarios. Although attack trees are popular, they lack
support for modeling the temporal dependencies between the
attack tree components. To overcome this limitation, we utilize
an automated state-of-the-art SMC tool UPPAAL [9]. Our
approach overall involves translating the constructed security
and privacy attack tree of the VRLE application into the
Stochastic Timed Automata (STA) in a compositional manner.
For the purposes of this paper, we define: (a) security – as
a condition that ensures a VR system to perform critical
functions with the establishment of confidentiality, integrity,
and availability [13], and (b) privacy – as a property that
regulates the IoT data collection, protection, and secrecy in
interactive systems [13].
The main paper contributions summary is as follows:
– We propose a framework to evaluate security and privacy of
VR applications using the attack tree formalism and statistical
model checking. To show the effectiveness of our solution
approach, we utilize a VRLE application case study viz.,
vSocial that uses edge computing assisted IoT devices for
students and instructor(s) collaboration.
– We perform a trade-off analysis by evaluating the severity of
different types of attacks on the considered VRLE application.
From our results, we observe that: i) unauthorized access and
causes of DoS attack (in security attack tree), ii) track user
movement and user physical location (in privacy attack tree)
are the most vulnerable candidates in a VRLE.
– We demonstrate the effectiveness of using design principles
(also known as security principles) i.e., hardening, diversity,
principle of least privilege on the privacy and security of
VRLE applications in the event of most severe threats. We
show that in terms of security – a combination of {hardening,
principle of least privilege} is most influential in reducing the
probability of Loss of Integrity (LoI). Similarly for privacy – a
combination of {diversity, principle of least privilege} is most
influential in reducing privacy leakage.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II discusses related works. Section III introduces the
necessary background and terminology. Section IV discusses
the proposed security and privacy framework in detail. Sec-
tion V presents the numerical results using our proposed
framework on the VRLE case study. Section VI discusses the
effectiveness of design principles on the security and privacy
threat scenarios. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
There have been several comprehensive studies that high-
light the importance of security and privacy threats on IoT and
related paradigms such as Augmented Reality (AR) with IoT
devices, and edge computing. A recent study [1] on challenges
in AR and VR discusses the threat vectors for educational
initiatives without characterizing the attack impact. Survey
articles [2]–[4], [14]–[16] are significant for understanding the
concepts of threat taxonomy and attack surface area of IoT and
fog computing. They highlight the need to go beyond specific
components such as network, hardware or application, and
propose end-to-end solutions that consider system and data
vulnerabilities. An observation given the above state-of-art is
that there are very few scholarly works on the quantitative
evaluation for these security and privacy threats in the context
of VR applications.
We borrow the attack trees concept that is used commonly
in cyber-physical systems involving SCADA system [17], and
adapt it for threat modeling to determine the probability of
detection and severity of threats. One of our preliminary
works [18] showed risk assessment of security, privacy and
safety metrics of the VRLE applications utilizing an attack
tree simulation tool. In contrast, this work focus is on formal
modeling of attack trees using STAs and utilizes a state-of-the-
art formal verification tool to evaluate the developed security
and privacy attack trees. In addition, our proposed framework
incorporates the concept of design principles to enhance the
security and privacy of VRLE applications.
Amongst the numerous prior works on attack trees, the
work in [7] presents a novel concept of Attack Fault Tree
(AFT), a combination of both attack and fault trees. A model
of STA [10] alleviates some assumptions made in timed
automata and provides advantages such as choice of transi-
tions requiring satisfaction of very precise clock constraints.
Timed automata [19] provides an abstract model of the real
system by using clocks as well as timing constraints on the
transition edges. As compared to Continuous-Time Markov
Chains (CTMC) [20], STA models allow us to express hard
time constraints such as x≤t. We studied the above existing
modeling techniques to formalize our security and privacy
attack trees into STA, which we evaluate using a model
checking tool viz., the UPPAAL SMC [21].
III. BACKGROUND AND TERMINOLOGY
A. Attacks in VRLE application use case:
The users in a social VRLE are networked and geograph-
ically distributed, which creates a series of potential attack
scenarios. Using vSocial shown in Figure 1 as a social VRLE
case study, herein we demonstrate exemplar security and
privacy attacks that can affect the VRLE application sessions.
Security Attacks: An attacker can gain unauthorized access
to either tamper any confidential information (user, network,
VRLE components) by impersonating as a valid user, or
disclose compromised confidential information. To elucidate,
the instructional content in a vSocial application is in a web-
enabled presentation format using the features present in High
Fidelity. To guide the students through activities in the vSocial
learning environment, the instructor will have privileged access
to control the learning content settings such as e.g., editing the
slides, and rewarding the students based on their performance.
Fig. 2: Unauthorized access to VRLE learning content.
Gaining Unauthorized access to the instructor account as
shown in Figure 2 can lead to disclosure of user information,
and tampering of the learning content in vSocial to negatively
impact the users’ (students’) learning experience.
Fig. 3: Privacy attack on vSocial application.
Privacy Attacks: A user privacy breach can involve an
intruder entering a VRLE world with fake credentials to snoop
into the virtual classroom conversations. The attacker can then
disrupt an ongoing VRLE session by obstructing the view of
the users in their learning sessions and can even disorient the
content. Disorientation can possibly lead to a user running
into a wall and getting physically hurt. Privacy attacks can
also involve packet tampering that was demonstrated in [18],
where an attacker performs illegal packet capture in order to
extract sensitive information (packet sniffing attack). A poten-
tial privacy breach can occur when the attacker discloses the
confidential information obtained from the captured packets as
shown in Figure 3. Using this packet sniffing attack, the avatar
(user virtual information) can also be disclosed with private
location information and student credentials.
B. Statistical model checking
Statistical model checking (SMC) is a variation of the well-
known classical model checking [22] approach for a system
that exhibits stochastic behavior. The SMC approach to solve
the model checking problem involves simulating (Monte Carlo
simulation) the system for finitely many runs, and using
hypothesis testing to infer whether the samples provide a
statistical evidence for the satisfaction or violation of the
specification [23].
Stochastic timed automata: Stochastic timed automata (STA)
is an extended version of timed automata (TA) with stochastic
semantics. A STA associates logical locations with continuous,
generally distributed sojourn times [19]. In STA, constraints
on edges and invariants on locations, such as clocks are used
to enable transition from one state to another [7].
Definition 1 (Stochastic timed automata). Given a timed
automata which is equipped with assignment of invariants I
to locations L, we formulate an STA as a tuple T = 〈 L, linit,
Σ, X , E , I, µ 〉, where L is a finite set of locations, linit ∈ L is
the initial location, Σ is a finite set of actions, X is the finite
set of clocks, E ⊆ L × Lclk × Σ × 2X is a finite set of edges,
with Lclk representing the set of clock constraints, I: L −→
λ is the invariant where λ is the rate of exponential assigned
to the locations L, µ is the probability density function ( µl)
at a location l ∈ L.
Initial Wait Fail
initiate!
x := 0
fail?
Fig. 4: An exemplar STA.
An exemplar STA is shown in Figure 4 that consists of
the locations {Initial, Wait, Fail}. Herein, the Initial location
represents the start of execution of an STA and a clock x is
used to keep track of the global time. The communication in an
STA exists between its components using message broadcast
signals in a bottom-up approach. The STA is activated by
broadcasting initiate! signal, which transitions to wait location
and waits for the fail signal. In an STA, time delays are
governed as probability distributions (used as invariants) over
the locations. The Network of Stochastic Timed Automata
(NSTA) is defined by composing all component automaton
to obtain a complete stochastic system satisfying the general
compositionality criterion of TA transition rules [9], [19].
UPPAAL SMC: UPPAAL SMC is an integrated tool for
modeling, validation, and verification of real-time systems
modeled as a network of stochastic timed automata (NSTA)
extended with integer variable, invariant, and channel synchro-
nizations [21]. In SMC, the probability estimate is derived
using an estimation algorithm and statistical parameters, such
as 1−α (required confidence interval) and  (error bound) [24].
For instance, if we indicate goal state in the STA of Top_event
as Fail, then the probability of a successful occurrence within
time t can be written as: Pr[x <= t](<> Top_event.Fail)
where, <> represents the existential operator (♦) and x is a
clock in the STA to track the global time.
C. Design principles
To build a trustworthy VRLE system architecture which en-
sures security and privacy, integration of design principles in
the life cycle of edge computing interconnected and distributed
IoT device based systems is essential [25]. We adapt the
following three design principles from NIST SP800-160 [13],
[25] such as: (i) Hardening – defined as reinforcement of
individual or types of components to ensure that they are
harder to compromise or impair, (ii) Diversity – defined as the
implementation of a feature with diverse types of components
to restrict the threat impact from proliferating further into
the system, and (iii) Principle of least privilege – defined as
limiting the privileges of any entity, that is just enough to
perform its functions and prevents the effect of threat from
propagating beyond the affected component.
IV. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
In this section, we present details of our proposed frame-
work that uses preliminary results from the previous section
(Section III) for security and privacy analysis (i.e., to identify
the most vulnerable attacks) of social VRLE applications. An
overview of the steps followed in our framework is shown
in Figure 5. Firstly, we outline the threat scenarios in a
social VRLE application [5] using traditional approaches.
Fig. 5: Proposed framework for security, privacy analysis in social VRLE.
Secondly, we use an attack tree formalism for the modeling
procedures. Following this, each attack tree is translated into
an equivalent STA to form an NSTA, which is input into the
UPPAAL SMC tool. Lastly, we use the quantitative assessment
from the tool to determine if the probability of disruption
is higher than a set threshold (user specified requirements).
Based on this determination, we subsequently prescribe the
design principles such as: hardening, diversity and principle
of least privilege that can be adopted in VRLE deployments.
Overall, our framework steps help us to investigate potential
security, privacy attack scenarios and recommend the design
alternatives based on design principles for securing an edge
computing based VRLE application.
A. Formalization of security and privacy attack trees
Attack trees are hierarchical models that show how an at-
tacker goal (root node) can be refined into smaller sub-goals
(child/intermediate nodes) via gates until no further refinement
is possible such that the basic attack steps (BAS) are reached.
BAS represents the leaf nodes of an attack tree [26]. The leaf
nodes and the gates connected in the attack trees are termed
as attack tree elements. To explore dependencies in attack
surfaces, attack trees enable sharing of subtrees. Hence, attack
trees are often considered as directed acyclic graphs, rather
than trees [7].
Definition 2 (Attack trees). An attack tree A is defined as a
tuple {N ,Child, Top_event, l} ∪ {AT_elements} where, N is
a finite set of nodes in the attack tree; Child: N → N* maps
each set of nodes to its child nodes; Top_event is an unique
goal node of the attacker where Top_event ∈ N; l: is a set
of labels for each node n ∈ N ; and AT_elements: is a set of
elements in an attack tree A.
Attack tree elements: Attack tree elements aid in generating
an attack tree and are defined as a set of {G ∪ L} where, G
represents gates; L represents leaf nodes. Following are the
descriptions of each of the AT elements.
Attack tree gates: Given an attack tree A, we formally
define the attack tree gates G = {OR,AND,SAND}.2 An
2We limit our modeling to these three gates, however attack trees can adopt
any other gates from the static/dynamic fault trees.
AND gate is disrupted when all its child nodes are disrupted,
whereas an OR gate is disrupted if either of its child nodes
are disrupted. Similarly, SAND gate is disrupted when all its
child nodes are disrupted from left to right using the condition
that the success of a previous step determines the success of
the upcoming child node. The output nodes of the gates using
these gates G in an attack tree A are defined as Intermediate
nodes (I), which will be located at a level that is greater than
the leaf nodes.
Attack tree leaves: An attack tree leaf node is the terminal
node with no other child node(s). It can be associated with
basic attack steps (BAS), which collectively represent all the
individual atomic steps within a composite attack scenario. To
elucidate, for an attacker to perform intrusion, the prospective
BAS can include: (i) identity spoofing, and (ii) unauthorized
access to the system depending on the attacker profile. Thus,
every BAS appears as an implicit leaf node of the attack tree.
We assume the attack duration to have an exponential rate
and model the equation as : P (t) = 1 − eλt where, λ is
the rate of exponential distribution. We use this exponential
distribution because of its tractability and ease of handling,
and also because it is defined by a single parameter.
Security and privacy attack trees: Based on the results
discussed in Section III and experimental evidence from our
prior work [18], we model threat scenarios in the form of
a security attack tree (that lists potential VRLE security
threats) and privacy attack tree (that lists potential VRLE
privacy threats) as shown in Figures 6 and 7, respectively. The
descriptions of the leaf nodes are listed in Table I. Exploring
the security aspect in CIA triad of {Confidentiality, Integrity,
Availability} may result into an enormous number of leaf
nodes in the attack tree. Consequently, in this work we only
focus on the Loss of Integrity (LoI) and privacy leakage to
address the respective security and privacy threat scenarios that
can disrupt the user experience in a social VRLE. Creation of
new security and privacy trees for issues related to LoC and
LoA can be performed similar to the approach presented for
LoI; such details are beyond the scope of this paper.
Moreover, the listed attack trees are useful when they are
concerned with user privacy and safety in a VRLE system.
To elucidate, critical VRLE applications such as flight sim-
ulations, military training exercises and vSocial (developed
for children with ASD) are sensitive to information disclosure
attacks that can cause significant disruption for the stakeholder
participants. If an attacker compromises such sensitive infor-
mation, it can be used to harm the participants in the form of
e.g., a chaperone attack (to make a user run into walls) and
other physical safety attacks detailed in [4].
B. Translation of attack trees into stochastic timed automata
In this section, we generate STA from the corresponding
security and privacy attack trees shown in Figures 6 and 7.
In our translational approach: (i) each of the leaf nodes in
these attack trees is converted into an individual STA. The
intermediate events, which are basically the output of the logic
gates used at different levels are converted imperatively into
Fig. 6: Formalized security attack tree with threat scenarios disrupting LoI.
Fig. 7: Formalized privacy attack tree with threat scenarios disrupting privacy leakage.
Fig. 8: STA for root node.
STA; (ii) the generated STAs are composed in parallel by
including the root node; (iii) the obtained NSTA is then used
for statistical model checking in order to verify the security
and privacy properties formalized as SMC queries.
To demonstrate the translation of an attack tree into an STA,
we consider the security attack tree as shown in Figure 6. As
part of the translation, each of the security AT element (leaf
and gates) input signals are connected to the output signal
of child nodes. The generated network of STA communicates
using signals. initiate - indicates activation signal of attack tree
element. This signal is sent initially from the root node to its
children. fail - indicates disruption of that attack tree element.
This signal is sent to the parent node from its child node to
indicate an STA disruption. The scope of the above signals
can also be extended by special symbols such as: i)‘?’ (e.g.,
initiate?) means that the event will wait for the reception of
the intended signal, ii) ‘!’(e.g., initiate!) implies output signal
broadcasts to other STA in the attack tree.
Illustrative example: For instance, we show the conversion
c
OR_activated
c c
Disrupt
initiate?
initiateA! initiateB! failA?
failB?
fail!
Fig. 9: STA for OR gate and root node of security attack tree.
of LoI i.e., root node (Top_event) into STA as shown in
Figure 8. The converted STA of the LoI is equipped with
initiate! and fail? signals. The root node is the OR gate
output for the two child nodes: (A) “System Compromise” and
(B) “Data Tampering”. Top OR gate sends an initiate signal
and activates its child nodes “System compromise” and “Data
Tampering” as shown in Figure 9 by broadcasting initiateA!
and initiateB! signals. After initialization, if either of the
nodes (A) OR (B) are disrupted, then a fail! signal is sent
to the Top_event, which forces a transition to Disrupt state,
representing LoI in the system. The clock x is a UPPAAL
global variable to keep track of the time progression as
mentioned in Section III. Similarly, STAs for the AND gate,
SAND gates and the leaf nodes are also developed. Moreover,
STAs for leaf nodes such as impersonation in the security
attack tree are instantiated with λ (rate of exponential) values.
For the given λ values to the leaf nodes, the probability of
occurrence is calculated. This value then propagates upward
TABLE I: Descriptions of leaf nodes in security and privacy attack trees.
Security Attack Tree Privacy Attack Tree
Leaf Node Components Description of Leaf Nodes Leaf Node Components Description of Leaf Nodes
Impersonation Attacker successfully assumes the identity of a valid user Unauthorized Access Attacker gains access to VR space
Packet Spoofing Spoofing packets from a fake IP address to impersonate User VR space location Attacker determines the user location in
VR space
Sync Flood Sends sync request to a target and direct server resources
away from legitimate traffic
Ping sweeping Attacker sends pings to a range of IP
addresses and identify active hosts
SQL Injection Attacker injects malicious commands in user i/p query
using GET and POST
Capture packets Attacker uses packet sniffer to capture
packet information
Insert Malicious Scripts Attacker successfully adds malicious scripts in VR Analyze packets To identify erroneous packets to tamper
Capture Packets The attacker uses a packet sniffer to capture packet
information
Intrusion Attacker performs an unauthorized activity
on VR space
Analyze Packets Attacker identifies erroneous packets to tamper Eavesdropping Attacker listens to conversations in VR space
Modify Sensitive Data To modify any sensitive information by eavesdropping Disclosure of sensitive
information
Attacker maliciously releases any captured sensitive data
User Login User login into VRLE
Capture hostname With IP address obtained, attacker can capture
the hostname in the VRLE application
Unauthorized Login Attacker gains access into VRLE by unauthorized means
Password Attacks Attacker recovers password of a valid-user
TABLE II: λ values for leaf nodes of security & privacy ATs.
Security AT Privacy AT
Security threats λ Privacy threats λ
Impersonation 0.006892 Unauthorized access 0.006478
User login 0.0089 User VR space location 0.0094
Password attacks 0.008687 Capture hostname 0.004162
Unauthorized login 0.008687 Ping sweeping 0.002162
Packet spoofing 0.0068 Capture packets 0.00098
SYNC flood 0.0068 Analyze packets 0.0048
SQL injection 0.00231788 Disclosure of sensitive info 0.0009298
Insert malicious scripts 0.008 Intrusion 0.006628
Capture packets 0.000 98 Eavesdropping 0.08
Analyze packets 0.0048 – –
Modify sensitive data 0.002642 – –
in the tree to calculate the probability of LoI. As mentioned
earlier, the developed STAs are composed using the parallel
composition [19] technique to form an NSTA, which is then
used for SMC by the UPPAAL tool [9].
V. QUANTITATIVE RESULTS
In this section, we present the results obtained using our
proposed framework. As mentioned in Section IV, the threat
scenarios we consider are: LoI and privacy leakage for security
and privacy attack trees (AT), respectively. In the following
analysis, we assume that our design requirement is to keep
the probability of LoI and privacy leakage below the threshold
of 0.25. For evaluation purposes, we use arbitrary values of
λ as parametric input to the leaf nodes as shown in Table II
obtained from [27], [28]. Note, after providing λ values as
parameters to the leaf nodes, we utilize the SMC queries as
explained in Section III-B to find the respective probabilities
of LoI and privacy leakage. Any other user specified threshold
values can also be used in our framework. This is due to the
fact that the model checking approach takes the user specified
values at the beginning of an experiment. For our experiment
purposes, we consider LoI (security attack tree) and privacy
leakage (privacy attack tree) as goal nodes. In the following set
of experiments, we present the obtained probability of the goal
nodes with respect to the time window used by the attacker.
A. Vulnerability analysis in the security AT
We assign the values of λ shown in Table II. However,
when assigning a λ value to a leaf node in the attack tree,
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Fig. 10: TS of security AT where - TS2, TS3, TS4, TS7 are the most
vulnerable nodes.
we consider a very small positive constant (K) ≈ 0.002
for the remaining leaf nodes. This is because, in real time
systems, multiple attack scenarios can happen. To identify a
vulnerability in a security attack tree, we analyze: (i) individual
leaf nodes, and (ii) combinations of leaf nodes, to determine
their effect on the probability of LoI occurrence.
i) Individual leaf node analysis: In Figure 10, we show
the probability of LoI over multiple time windows for each
leaf node in the security attack tree. We perform a thorough
analysis of leaf nodes in the security attack tree for threat
scenarios across different time intervals i.e., t = {0, 60, 120,
180}. For the individual leaf node analysis, the considered
threat scenarios (TS) shown in Figure 10 are termed as: TS1
– insert malicious scripts, TS2 – packet spoofing, TS3 –
unauthorized login, TS4 – password attacks, TS5 – modify
data, TS6 – analyze packets, TS7 – Sync flood, TS8 –
SQL injection, TS9 – capture packets, TS10 – impersonation,
TS11 – user login. As shown in Figure 10, the leaf nodes TS3
and TS4 (for unauthorized access) as well as TS2 and TS7
(for DoS attack) are the most vulnerable in the security attack
tree with the probability of 0.53.
ii) Analysis using combination of leaf nodes: Herein, we
consider combinations of leaf nodes to identify their impact
on LoI. For these experiments, we explore two scenarios: In
the first scenario, we consider combinations of leaf nodes that
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Fig. 11: TS of security AT where – TS6*, TS7* are the most vulnerable
combination.
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Fig. 12: TS of privacy AT where - PTS1, PTS3, PTS4, PTS9 are the
most vulnerable nodes.
belong to the same sub-tree, and in the second scenario, we
consider leaf nodes from different sub-trees. The considered
combination of threat scenarios are enlisted as: TS1* – {im-
personation, SQL injection}, TS2* – {impersonation, modify
data}, TS3* – {SQL injection, capture packets}, TS4* – {pwd
attacks, SQL injection}, TS5* – {impersonation, packet spoof-
ing}, TS6* – {packet spoofing, unauthorized login}, TS7*
– {unauthorized login, Sync flood}. As shown in Figure 11,
TS6* and TS7* are the most vulnerable combination of threat
scenarios with a probability of 1 for an LoI event. As part of
further analysis in Section VI, we discuss about the potential
candidates for design principles to apply on these leaf nodes
such that the VRLE application resilience against security
threats is enhanced.
B. Vulnerability analysis in the privacy AT
We analyze the privacy attack tree similarly for: (i) individual
leaf nodes, and (ii) combinations of leaf nodes. For the consid-
ered individual leaf node analysis in the privacy attack tree, the
threat scenarios are termed as: PTS1 – unauthorized access,
PTS2 – capture packets, PTS3 – user VR space location,
PTS4 – ping sweeping, PTS5 – analyze packets, PTS6 –
disclosure of sensitive information, PTS7 – intrusion, PTS8
– eavesdropping, PTS9 – capture hostname. As shown in
Figure 12, the most vulnerable leaf nodes are: PTS1, PTS3,
PTS4, PTS9 with the highest probability of privacy leakage
of 0.34.
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Fig. 13: TS of privacy AT where – PTS1* is the most vulnerable
combination.
For the analysis of combination of leaf nodes, we refer to the
combination of threat scenarios as: PTS1* – {unauthorized
access, user VR space location}, PTS2*– {capture packets,
disclosure of sensitive information}, PTS3* – {unauthorized
access, disclosure of sensitive information}, PTS4* – {cap-
ture packets, analyze packets}. As shown in Figure 13, PTS1*
is the most vulnerable combination of threats for privacy
leakage with a probability of 1. In summary, we can conclude
that the above numerical analysis shown in Table III on both
security and privacy attack trees can help in identifying the
LoI and privacy leakage concerns that need to be addressed
in the social VRLE design.
VI. RECOMMENDED DESIGN PRINCIPLES
In this section, we are examining the effect of applying
various design principles to the most vulnerable components
identified in the Sections V-A, and V-B. Existing works such
as NIST SP800-160 document [13], [25] suggest that the
services for safeguarding security and privacy are critical for
successful operation of current devices and sensors connected
to physical networks as part of IoT systems. As mentioned in
Section III-C, these design principles are essential to construct
a trustworthy edge computing based system architecture.
The goal is to apply a combination of design principles at
different levels of abstraction to help in developing effective
mitigation strategies. We adopt a selection of design principles
such as hardening, diversity and principle of least privilege
among the list of principles available in NIST document [13],
and [25]. In the following, we demonstrate their effectiveness
by showing that there is a reduction in the probability of
disruption terms after adopting them in our VRLE system
design.
Implementation of design principles on security attack
tree: In this section, we apply design principles on one of
the identified vulnerable nodes of the security attack tree as
shown in Section V-A. For instance, we incorporate hardening
design principle on the password attacks, to study its effects
on the security metric LoI as shown in Figure 14. As part
of the hardening principle, we added new nodes such as a
firewall and a security protocol in the security attack tree.
Our results show that the probability of disruption of LoI is
TABLE III: Most vulnerable components considering the individual & combination of leaf nodes.
Level in
attack
trees
Analysis on security AT Analysis on privacy AT
Different
Scenarios
Identified vulnerable
components in security
AT
Different
Scenarios
Identified vulnerable
components in privacy
AT
Individual
leaf nodes
Leaf nodes where
probability of
disruption in LoI at
(t ≤ 180) = 0.53
Unauthorized login Leaf nodes where
probability of
disruption in privacy leakage
at (t ≤ 180) = 0.34
Unauthorized access
Packet spoofing User VR space location
Sync flood Ping sweeping
Password attacks Capture hostname
Combinat
-ion of leaf
nodes
Leaf nodes where
probability of
disruption in LoI
at (t ≤ 180) = 1
{Unauthorized login,
Packet spoofing},
{Unauthorized login,
Sync flood}
Leaf nodes where
probability of
disruption in privacy leakage at
(t ≤ 180) = 1
{Unauthorized access,
user VR space location}
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Fig. 14: Prob. in LoI reduced by 15.85% in security AT due to application
of design principles.
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Fig. 15: Prob. of privacy leakage reduced by 68% in privacy AT due to
application of design principles.
reduced from 0.82 to 0.69 (15.85%), with the given attacker
profile. The decrease in the disruption of LoI is due to the
rise in additional resources that are required by the attacker
to compromise such a VRLE application system which is
incorporating the hardening principle. Similarly, we apply the
principle of least privilege on the security attack tree, which
under-provisions privileges intentionally. This in turn reduced
the probability of disruption of LoI from 0.82 to 0.79 (3.66%).
Implementation of design principles on privacy attack tree:
Using the similar approach mentioned in design principles on
the security attack tree, we apply diversity design principle on
one of the identified vulnerable nodes (unauthorized access) in
the privacy attack tree. After adding multi-factor authentication
procedures as part of the diversity principle, the probability of
disruption on privacy leakage is reduced significantly from
0.5 to 0.16 (68%) as shown in Figure 15. Similarly, we
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Fig. 16: Prob. of LoI is reduced by 26% in security AT due to application
of design principles for a combination of security attack tree nodes.
apply the principle of least privilege by under-provisioning
privileges on the privacy attack tree where the probability of
disruption of privacy leakage is slightly reduced from 0.5 to
0.48 (4%). Thus, from the above implementation of individual
design principles, we conclude that hardening and diversity
are more effective in reducing the disruption of LoI and
privacy leakage, respectively. Thus, our findings shows that
some security principles are more effective than others. In
addition, our results emphasize the benefits in implementing a
combination of design principles in both security and privacy
attack trees to overall improve the attack mitigation efforts.
To study the effect on disruption of the LoI and privacy
leakage, we adopt a combination of design principles such
as: (i) for the security attack tree: {hardening, principle of
least privilege}, and (ii) for the privacy attack tree: {diversity,
principle of least privilege}. We observe that there is a
significant drop in the probability of disruption of LoI from
0.81 to 0.6 (26%), and 0.5 to 0.1 (80%) for privacy leakage
as shown in Figures 16 and 17, respectively.
From the above numerical analysis, we can conclude that in-
corporating relevant combination of standardized design prin-
ciples and their joint implementation have the potential to bet-
ter mitigate the impact of sophisticated and well-orchestrated
cyber attacks on edge computing assisted VRLE systems with
IoT devices. In addition, our above results provide insights
on how the adoption of the design principles can provide the
necessary evidence to support a trustworthy level of security
and privacy for the users in VRLE systems that are used
for important societal applications such as: special education,
surgical training, and flight simulators.
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Fig. 17: Prob. of privacy leakage reduced by 80% in privacy AT due to
application of design principles for a combination of privacy AT nodes.
VII. CONCLUSION
Social Virtual Reality Learning Environments (VRLEs) are
a new form of immersive VR applications, where security and
privacy issues are under-explored. In this paper, we presented a
novel framework that quantitatively assesses the security and
privacy threat scenarios for a social VRLE application case
study viz., vSocial. Specifically, we explored different threat
scenarios that possibly cause LoI (e.g., unauthorized access)
and privacy leakage (e.g., disclosure of sensitive user infor-
mation) in a set of social VRLE application session scenarios.
We utilized the attack tree formalism to model the security
and privacy threats. Specifically, we developed relevant attack
trees and converted them into stochastic timed automata and
then performed statistical model checking using the UPPAAL
SMC tool. Furthermore, we illustrated the effectiveness of our
framework by analyzing different design principle candidates.
We showed a ‘before’ and ‘after’ performance comparison to
investigate the effect of applying these design principles on
the probability of LoI and privacy leakage occurrence. The
highlights from our experiments with realistic social VRLE
application scenarios indicate that some security principles
are more effective than others. However, combining them can
result in a more effective mitigation mechanism. For instance,
among the design principle candidates, (i) {hardening, prin-
ciple of least privilege} is the best design principle combi-
nation for enhancing security, and (ii) {diversity, principle of
least privilege} is the best design principle combination for
enhancing privacy.
In future, we plan to explore the effect of fault and attacks
as a combination using the attack-fault tree formalism [7] for
VRLE applications. This will allow us to reason about the
safety metrics and study the safety, security and privacy trade-
offs. Since, different components in a typical social VRLE
application go through different maintenance actions, we also
plan to explore the impact of various maintenance strategies
on the reliability metric of social VRLE applications using the
fault maintenance tree formalism [29].
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